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11 Introduction
It has been well known ever since Blackwell (1953) that, in a decision problem
(i.e., a one-person game) with incomplete information, better information on
the environment yields higher value of the problem. It is also well known
that similar statements do not apply in general to games with more than one
player (see, e.g., Hirshleifer (1971)): improving the information of one player
while ￿xing the information endowments of the rest may lead in equilibrium
to lower expected payo⁄to that player. A big body of literature has been ded-
icated to identifying classes of games where the equilibrium payo⁄of a player
is monotonically increasing/decreasing with an improvement of his informa-
tion endowment, i.e., where the value of information is positive/negative.
(See, e.g., Bassan et al (2003), Kamien et al (1990), Neyman (1991), Lehrer
et al (2006), in the context of general games; and Gal-Or (1985,1986), Raith
(1996), Sakai (1985), Shapiro (1986), and Vives (1984,1988) in the context of
oligopolistic markets.) There has also been a strand of research devoted to
a closely related question, of whether a player who is better informed than
some of his rivals, in a game where the players are symmetric in all but their
information endowments, receives in equilibrium more than his less-informed
rivals; in other words, whether information advantage is rewarded in equilib-
rium. (See, e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1986) in the context of auctions; Einy
et al (2002) in the context of Cournot oligopoly; Koutsougeras and Yannelis
(1993), Krasa and Yannelis (1994) in the context of exchage economies.)
Einy et al (2001) showed that information advantage of a ￿rm is rewarded
in any equilibrium of an incomplete information Cournot oligopoly, under
very light assumptions on the demand (commonplace in the literature): the
inverse demand function needs to be di⁄erentiable and monotonicaly decreas-
ing. Cost functions, however, must to be a¢ ne; despite this limitation, the
result is nonetheless of great appeal because of the generality of the inverse
demand functions that it admits.
This work contains two generalizations of the information advantage re-
sult of Einy et al (2009). Our ￿rst generalization pertains to the de￿nition
of information advantage itself. The classical notion of player (￿rm) i being
better informed than j involves a global comparison of players￿information:
at any state of nature, i must know at least what j knows at that state.
However, if i has a better knowledge only of directly payo⁄-relevant data, we
may still deem him better informed than j. Does the result of Einy et al
(2002) still obtain under this weaker notion of better information?
2We answer this question in the a¢ rmative in Section 3, under certain
conditions (that are quite general if there are just two ￿rms). We assume
that each state of nature is separable into two components, one that conveys
information about market fundamentals (the demand and costs), and one
that does not (i.e., it is a "sunspot" ￿see, e.g., Aumann et al (1988) ￿which
may be related to political events and decisions that do not immediately a⁄ect
the business climate). Note that ￿rms may try to condition their strategies
on the sunspot component, thereby a⁄ecting other ￿rms￿expectations and
ultimately the outcome of the game. Thus, although not containing payo⁄-
relevant information, the presense of sunspots may have a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on equilibrium outcomes. Our result is, however, that when ￿rm i is at least
as well informed about the market fundamentals as ￿rm j (i.e., i is at least
as well informed as j about the payo⁄-relevant components of the sates of
nature), the information advantage is rewarded in equilibrium as in Einy et
al (2002) ￿see Theorem 1.
Our Section 4 is dedicated to a di⁄erent generalization of the information
advantage result: we consider non-di⁄erentiable inverse demand functions.
With non-di⁄erentiable but concave inverse demand functions the equilib-
rium may not be unique even in the complete information case with sym-
metric ￿rms, which shows that not every equilibrium re￿ ects information
advantage (or symmetry). However, we show that under general conditions
there is at least one equilibrium that does it ￿see Theorem 2.
Finally, Section 5 considers oligopolies with always non-negative prices. It
was shown in Einy et al (2009) that Bayesian Cournot equilibrium may fail to
exist when the inverse demand functions are always non-negative (as they are
in reality), and that "truncating" the inverse demand function at zero so as to
make it always non-negative may signi￿cantly change strategic considerations
in the model. We show, however, that the conclusions of Theorems 1 and 2
remain valid even with always non-negative inverse demand functions, under
conditions for equilibrium existence set forth in Einy et al (2009).
2 Cournot Competition with Incomplete In-
formation
Consider an industry where a set of ￿rms, N = f1;2;:::;ng; compete in the
production of a homogeneous good. There is uncertainty about the market
3demand and the production costs. This uncertainty is described by a ￿nite
set ￿ of states of nature, together with a probability measure ￿ on ￿; which
represents the common prior belief of the ￿rms about the distribution of the
realized state. The information of the ￿rms about the state of nature may
be incomplete: the private information of ￿rm i 2 N is given by a partition
￿i of ￿ into disjoint sets. For any ! 2 ￿; ￿i (!) denotes the information set
of i given !; that is, the element of ￿i that contains !: W.l.o.g., we assume
that ￿ has full support on ￿; that is, ￿(￿i (!)) > 0 for every i 2 N and
! 2 ￿: If, for i;j 2 N; ￿j ￿ ￿i; we shall say that ￿rm i is at least as well
informed as ￿rm j:
If qi (!) denotes the quantity of the good produced by ￿rm i in state
! 2 ￿; and Q(!) ￿
Pn
i=1 qi (!) is the aggregate output in !; then the pro￿t










i (!)P (!;Q(!)) ￿ c(!)q
i (!)
where P (!;￿) is the inverse demand function in !, and c(!) is the constant
marginal cost of ￿rm i in !. (Thus, the ￿rms are symmetric in all but their
information.)
We assume throughout that:
(i) For every ! 2 ￿; c(!) > 0.
(ii) For every ! 2 ￿; P (!;￿) is non-increasing, and for every ! 2 ￿
there exists a level of aggregate output 0 < Q(!) < 1 such that for every
Q < Q(!)







if Q(!) < 1: We refer to Q(!) as the horizontal demand intercept in !:1
A (pure) strategy for ￿rm i is a function qi : ￿ ! R+ that speci￿es its
output in every state of nature, subject to measurability with respect to i￿ s
private information (i.e., qi is constant on every information set of ￿rm i).
The set of strategies of ￿rm i will be denoted by ￿i: Given a strategy pro￿le
q = (q1;:::;qn) 2
Qn
j=1 ￿j the expected pro￿t of ￿rm i is
U











1A demand intercept arises in standard complete information models with a linear or
concave inverse demand function. Existence of a demand intercept is consistent with (and
usually implied by) Novshek￿ s condition ￿see Remark 5.1 in Novshek (1985).
4A strategy pro￿le q￿ 2
Qn
j=1 ￿j a (pure strategy Bayesian) Cournot equi-
librium, if no ￿rm ￿nds it pro￿table to unilaterally deviate to another strat-
egy, i.e., if for every i 2 N and qi 2 ￿i
U





where (q￿ j qi) stands for the pro￿le of strategies which is identical to q￿ in all





















for every ! 2 ￿: Here E(g(￿) j A) stands for the expectation of a random
variable g conditional on event A.
Remark 1. Note that, for any Cournot equilibrium q￿ and any i 2 N;
q
i
￿ (￿) ￿ max
!2￿
Q(!); (3)
since otherwise a ￿rm could deviate to the strategy of zero output in all sates
of nature, and save its costs.
3 Separable Information and Information Ad-
vantage
It was shown in Einy et al (2002) that the information advantage of a ￿rm
is rewarded in any equilibrium of an oligopoly, assuming only monotonicity
and di⁄erentiability of the inverse demand function (the costs must be lin-
ear, however). The notion of information advantage of ￿rm i over ￿rm j is
straightorward. Firm i needs to be better informed, globally, than ￿rm j
: any information set of i must be contained in some information set of j,
which is equivalently expressed by the inclusion ￿j ￿ ￿i:
A weaker notion of information advantage of i over j can be contemplated,
whereby ￿rm i has a better knowledge of only payo⁄-relevant data (that
determines the inverse demand and costs). At the same time, the ￿rm need
not be better informed (globally), i.e., it may be the case that ￿j * ￿i and
in particular i may have less knowledge than j of all other, payo⁄-irrelevant,
data. We will introduce this notion fromally in Section 3.2.
53.1 An Auxiliary result: Uniqueness of Cournot Equi-
librium
Consider the following condition on the inverse demand, which is akin to the
collation of (2) and (3) in Theorem 3 in Novshek (1985):
(A) For every ! 2 ￿; P (!;￿) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable and
satis￿es
QP
00 (!;Q) + P
0 (!;Q) ￿ 0 (4)
for every Q 2 R+: (At Q = 0 we have in mind the right-side derivatives of P
and P 0:)
Inequality (4) in condition (A) is equivalent to the requirement that the
marginal revenue of a ￿rm be decreasing in the aggregate output of the other
￿rms. It is satis￿ed, e.g., by all decreasing, concave, and twice continuously
di⁄erentiable inverse demand functions.
Our auxiliary result, Proposition 1, gives a su¢ cient condition for exis-
tence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium. In addition to (A), we assume
that there are two types of information endowments of ￿rms, as is formally
stated in (B):
(B) The set N of ￿rms can be partitioned into two disjoint sets, K and
M; such that 1 2 K; 2 2 M; and such that ￿i = ￿1 for every i 2 K; ￿j = ￿2
for every j 2 M:
Note that (B) is satis￿ed trivially in a duopoly.
Proposition 1. Consider an oligopoly satisfying conditions (i), (ii), (A);
and (B), and such that for every ! 2 ￿; P 0 (!;￿) < 0. Then it has a unique
Cournot equilibrium q￿ which, moreover, has the equal treatment property:
qi
￿ = q1
￿ for every i 2 K; qj
￿ = q2
￿ for every j 2 M:
Proof. By Theorem 1A in Einy et al (2009), the oligopoly has at least
one Cournot equilibrium. We will show that it is unique.



















6is maximized (and in particular locally maximized) at qi = qi
￿ for every ! 2 ￿;










for every ! in which qi










for every ! in which qi
￿ = 0:
Note that for each ! 2 ￿ the function
F(q;Q) = qP
0 (!;Q) + P (!;Q) ￿ c(!)
is decreasing in q and non-increasing in Q when q ￿ Q: Indeed, @F
@q =
P 0 (!;Q) < 0 by assumption, and @F
@Q = qP 00 (!;Q)+P 0 (!;Q) ￿ 0 as follows
from P(!;￿) being decreasing and condition A. Now suppose that q￿ and q￿￿
are two Cournot equilibria: That F is decreasing in q and non-increasing in
























(inequality in both coordinates and strict inequality in the ￿rst coordinate)
on any atom ￿i (!) of ￿i: This is because otherwise conditions (6) and (7)
would not hold simultaneously for max((qi
￿;Q￿);(qi
￿￿;Q￿￿)). To summarize,
any ￿rm￿ s equilibrium strategy and the aggregate output in equilibrium can-

























on any element of ￿i.
We will next show that every Cournot equilibrium satis￿es the equal
treatment property. Indeed, if q￿ is a Cournot equilibrium, and qi
￿ 6= qj
￿ where
i and j are ￿rms of the same type, then consider an n-tuple q￿￿ obtained
from q￿ by interchanging i and j. Clearly, q￿￿ is also a Cournot equilibrium.




obvious fact that Q￿ = Q￿￿ leads to contradiction with (8). Thus, the equal
treatment property holds in any Cournot equilibrium.
7Now suppose that q￿ and q￿￿ are Cournot equilibria in the oligopoly. We




























Assume, w.l.o.g., that ￿ = max!2￿ (jKj ￿ jq1
￿ (!) ￿ q1
￿￿ (!)j); and that let







But then, on ￿1 (!0);





















is a non-negative function on ￿1 (!0) by the choice of !0: Thus Q￿ ￿ Q￿￿





Assume that the set of states of nature ￿ is a product set ￿1 ￿ ￿2; and
that the common prior ￿ is a product measure ￿1 ￿ ￿2: The probability
space (￿1;￿1) will be regarded as the space of payo⁄-relevant states, that
contain all information pertaining to the market fundamentals (the demand
and ￿rms￿ costs), while (￿2;￿2) will be regarded as the space of payo⁄-
irrelevant states that represents all other uncertainty that there might be
("sunspots"). Accordingly, the (state-dependent) inverse demand and cost
depend on !1 2 ￿1 but not on !2 2 ￿2 :







for every !1 2 ￿1; every !2;!0
2 2 ￿2; and every Q ￿ 0: Denote the expressions
in (11) and (12) by P1 (!1;Q) and c1 (!1), respectively.
Assume further that each agent i￿ s information about the realized payof-
relevant state is given by a partition ￿i
1 of ￿1; and about the payo⁄-irrelevant
8state ￿by a partition ￿i
2 of ￿2: Thus, if ! = (!1;!2) 2 ￿ is realized, i￿ s
information set ￿i (!) is the product set ￿i
1 (!1) ￿ ￿i
2 (!2), where ￿i
k (!k) is
the element of ￿i
k of ￿k that contains !k:
An oligopoly O conforming to such a description will be called an oligopoly
with separable information: information can be decomposed into the payo⁄-
relevant component and the payo⁄-irrrelevant component.
The functions P1 (￿;￿); c1 (￿); and the partitions f￿i
1gi2N can be viewed as
the inverse demand and the marginal cost, and the information endowments
of ￿rms, respectively, in a restricted oligopoly O1 associated with O; where
the uncertainty is described by the space of payo⁄-relevant states (￿1;￿1):
Compared with the oligopoly O with separable information, in the restricted
oligopoly O1 the ￿rms possess the same payo⁄-relevant information, but are
ignorant of the data which is not payo⁄-relevant.
Note that any oligopoly can be represented as the one with separable in-
formation: any ￿ is isomorphic to the product ￿1￿￿2 where ￿1 = ￿ and ￿2
is a singleton. However, it is easy to think of oligopolies with separable infor-
mation where a non-trivial decomposition ￿ = ￿1￿￿2 is present inherently.
There may be uncertainty about the market demand and costs, represented
by ￿1; but also incomplete information on variables other than the market
fundamentals (such as political events and decisions that do not immediately
a⁄ect the business climate). These payo⁄-irrelevant signals, or "sunspots",
on which ￿rms may try to condition their strategies, thereby a⁄ecting other
￿rms￿expectations and ultimately the outcome of the game, are represented
by ￿2:






we will say that ￿rm i is at least as well informed about the market funda-
mentals as ￿rm j: This is an extension of the standard version of possessing
a better information, whereby the inclusion in (13) would need to hold for
the information partitions ￿j and ￿i of ￿: However, according to (13), the
better knowledge should only pertain to market fundamentals, as represented
by partitions of ￿1 induced by ￿j and ￿i: Firm i with a better information
about the market fundamentals may, according to our de￿nition, have lit-
tle or no knowledge of the realized state in ￿2; even if j always has this
knowledge.
93.3 Information advantage
According to our main result of this section, a ￿rm which is at least as well
informed about the market fundamentals as a ￿rm of another type, receives
at least as much in the unique Cournot equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Consider an oligopoly O with separable information such
that conditions (i), (ii), (A), and (B) are satis￿ed, and for every ! 2 ￿;
P 0 (!;￿) < 0. Assume that ￿rm 1 is at least as well informed about the
market fundamentals as ￿rm 2. Then in the unique equilibrium q￿;
U
1 (q￿) ￿ U
2 (q￿): (14)
Proof. By Proposition 1, the restricted oligopoly O1 possesses a unique
equilibrium q￿1; which moreover satis￿es the equal treatement property. For
every ! = (!1;!2) 2 ￿ and i 2 N; denote
q
i
￿ (!1;!2) ￿ q
i
￿1 (!1): (15)




j=1 ￿j is an equilibrium in the original
oligopoly O. Indeed, let !0 = (!0
1;!0
2) 2 ￿; i 2 N; and qi 2 ￿i: By (15) and
￿i-measurability of qi; the strategy pro￿le (q￿ j qi)(!1;!2) does not depend




2); and thus neither does the state-
dependent payo⁄ui ((￿;￿);(q￿ j qi)(￿;￿)): Let qi
1 be a strategy of ￿rm i in O1;
de￿ned by qi
1 (!1) ￿ qi (!1;!0
2) for !1 2 ￿i
1 (!0





































































where E￿1(g(￿) j A) stands for the expectation of a random variable g on ￿1
conditional on event A; with respect to the probability measure ￿1. Since
q￿1 is an equilibrium in O1; it follows from (16)-(18) and (2) that q￿ is an
equilibrium in O. By Proposition 1, q￿ = q￿ (the unique equilibrium in O).
Since ￿2
1 ￿ ￿1





























for every i 2 N; and thus (14) follows. ￿
4 Non-di⁄erentiable Market Demand and In-
formation Advantage
With non-di⁄erentiable but concave demand function, Cournot equilibium
exists in the oligopoly, although it may not be unique, even with complete
information. There may be equilibria that do not reward the information
advantage of a better-informed ￿rm, but we will show that there is at least
one equilibrium that does re￿ ect information advantage.
The following example demonstrates non-uniqueness of the equilibrium
in a complete information duopoly with a concave inverse demand:






1; if Q ￿ 0:99;
100(1 ￿ Q); if 0:99 < Q ￿ 1;
0; if Q > 1,
and have the marginal cost of 0:001. This is a symmetric duopoly with
multiple Cournot equilibria. In particular, in addition to the symmetric
equilibrium (0:495;0:495) there is a continuum of asymetric ones: every pair
(";0:99 ￿ ") is a Cournot equilibrium for " 2 [0:02;0:97]:
This example shows that, without a di⁄erentiability assumption on the
inverse demand, we cannot expect the expected equilibrium pro￿ts of ￿rms
to re￿ ect ￿rms￿information advantage, as in Einy et al (2002). Here, despite
having the same information on the environtment, a ￿rm may have a smaller,
or a larger, pro￿t than its rival. It is, however, obvious, that there is an
equilibrium that re￿ ects the information symmetry in the game, which is
the symmetric (0:495;0:495): Our aim is to show that, in a general oligopoly
with asymmetric information, concave inverse demand and linear costs, there
will always be at least one equilibrium rewarding a ￿rm with information
advantage.
11Let P (￿;￿) be a state dependent inverse demand function satisfying:
(C) For every ! 2 ￿; P (!;￿) is a continuous and concave function.
Theorem 2. Consider an oligopoly O that satis￿es conditions (i), (ii),
and (C). Assume that ￿rm 1 2 N is at least as well informed as ￿rm 2 2 N:
￿2 ￿ ￿1: Then there exists a Cournot equilibrium q￿ in which
U
1 (q￿) ￿ U
2 (q￿): (19)
Proof. Given any " > 0; consider a real-valued function P" de￿ned on






P" (!;Q + x)dx:
Since P (!;￿) is di⁄erentiable almost everywhere, being a concave function
by (C), P" (!;￿) is (continuously) di⁄erentiable everywhere, and concave.
Moreover, for every ! 2 ￿;
lim
"!0P" (!;￿) = P (!;￿) (20)
pointwise; the convergence is uniform on any given interval [0;z]; and in
particular for z = Z ￿ max!2￿ Q(!).
Consider an oligopoly O" which is identical to the given oligopoly O in all
but the inverse demand function, which is P": As in the proof of Theorem 1B
in Einy et al (2009), oligopoly O" has a Cournot equilibrium; denote one such
equilibrium by q"￿: Since all conditions of Theorem 1 in Einy et al (2002) are
satis￿ed by O" (in particular, the inverse demand function P" is di⁄erentiable
and nonincreasing), the information advantage of ￿rm 1 is rewarded in q"￿ :
U
1




" stands for the expected payo⁄ function of ￿rm i in O":






. If we identify the set of strategy
pro￿les with R
￿1￿:::￿￿n
+ ; by Remark 1 each q 1
n￿ is a point in the compact cube
[0;Z]
￿1￿:::￿￿n






thus has a convergent subsequence (w.l.o.g., the sequence itself) with a limit
q￿: We shall show that q￿ is an equilibrium in the oligopoly O:
12The convergence in (20) is uniform on [0;Z]; and hence lim"!0 Ui
" (q) =
Ui (q) uniformly in q 2 [0;Z]
￿1￿:::￿￿n







































and Ui is continuous on R
￿1￿:::￿￿n












for every i 2 N: Similarly, given i 2 N and qi 2 [0;Z]
￿i

















From the assumption of q 1
n￿ being an equilibrium in O 1
n and (1), it follows
that for every i 2 N and qi 2 [0;Z]
￿i
U



















and min(qi;Z) 2 [0;Z]
￿i
: Thus (24) in fact holds for every i 2 N and every
qi 2 ￿i; showing that q￿ is an equilibrium in the oligopoly O:
Now (21) and (22) imply (19). ￿
5 Information advantage in oligopolies with
always non-negative prices
In both Theorems 1 and 2 of the previous section Cournot equilibrium did
exist under conditions (A) or (C). However, uder these conditions, the inverse
demand function typically becomes negative for su¢ ciently large levels of
aggregate output: (This is also the case in the complete information setting
￿see remark 5.1 in Novshek (1985).) If the inverse demand is then truncated
to rule out non-negative prices, existence of a Cournot equilibrium cannot
13be guaranteed even in duopolies with linear demand functions, as seen in
examples 1 and 2 in Einy et al (2009).
In this section we adopt the Einy et al (2009) condition for equilibrium
existence with non-negative inverse demand functions, and present the cor-
responding versions of Theorems 1 and 2.
Consider a non-negative inverse demand function P, i.e., a function that
satis￿es P(!;Q) ￿ 0 for all ! 2 ￿ and Q 2 R+. Since for every ! 2 ￿;
P(!;￿) is non-increasing by assumption (ii), for Q ￿ Q(!) we have
P (!;Q) = 0: (25)
The analogs of Novshek￿ s condition (A); or the concavity condition (C);
will now be used in conjunction with the requirement that the inverse demand
be a non-negative function. These conditions must now be restated in the
form that makes them consistent with (25). (In what follows; the conditions
and assumptions on derivatives of P (!;￿) refer to one-sided derivatives at
the endpoints of the interval [0;Q(!)].2)
(A0) For every ! 2 ￿; P (!;￿) is a non-negative function, that is twice
continuously di⁄erentiable on [0;Q(!)] and satis￿es QP 00 (!;Q)+P 0 (!;Q) ￿
0 for every Q 2 [0;Q(!)].
(C0) For every ! 2 ￿; P (!;￿) is a non-negative function, that is contin-
uous and concave on [0;Q(!)], with a ￿nite left-hand derivative at Q(!):
The following condition is a slightly strenghtened version of a condition
used in Einy et al (2009), which in conjunction with (A) or (C) guarantees
exitence of equilibrium with always non-negative prices.
(D) There exists a pro￿le of state-dependent thresholds of output q 2
n Y
i=1




i (!) ￿ Q(!); (26)
2The function P (!;￿) need not (and typically will not) be di⁄erentiable at Q(!):
14and for every strategy pro￿le q 2
Yn
i=1 ￿i with qi ￿ qi for some i 2 N there
exists a strategy ri ￿ qi such that3
U
i (q) < U
i(q j r
i): (27)
Intuitively, condition D implies that each ￿rm i does not want to produce
too much, since by reducing its output below the level qi its expected pro￿t
increases.
Theorem 1￿ . Consider an oligopoly O with separable information such
that conditions (i), (ii), (A0), (B); and (D) are satis￿ed, and for every ! 2 ￿;
P 0 (!;￿) < 0 on [0;Q(!)]. Assume that ￿rm 1 is at least as well informed
about the market fundamentals as ￿rm 2. Then in the unique equilibrium
q￿;
U
1 (q￿) ￿ U
2 (q￿): (28)
Proof: For every ! 2 ￿ consider a function P￿ (!;Q) which is identical
to P (!;￿) on [0;Q(!)]; but is de￿ned by



























: Note that oligopoly O￿ which is identical to the given oligopoly
O in all but the inverse demand function, which is P￿; satis￿es all the condi-





oligopoly O￿ also satis￿es (D); and O and O￿ have the same set of Bayesian
equilibria. Thus, the conclusion of Theorem 1 applies to the oligopoly O. ￿
Theorem 2￿ . Consider an oligopoly O that satis￿es conditions (i), (ii),
(C0), and (D). Assume that ￿rm 1 2 N is at least as well informed as ￿rm
2 2 N: ￿2 ￿ ￿1: Then there exists a Cournot equilibrium q￿ in which
U
1 (q￿) ￿ U
2 (q￿):
3Here and henceforth, we use the notation h ￿ g (for h;g : ￿ ! R+) if and only if
h(!) ￿ g (!) for every ! 2 ￿:
15Proof: Repeat the arguments of the proof of Theorem 1￿ , with the fol-
lowing exception: for every ! 2 ￿; the function P￿ (!;Q) is de￿ned by
















; P 0 ￿
!;Q(!)
￿
stands for the left-hand side derivative of P at
Q(!); well de￿ned by assumption (C0). ￿
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